Politically valued resources and preferred outcomes: Does the political context matter?

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteiligte: Bailey, Nicholas, Norder, Kurt
In: Journal of Public Affairs, 19, 2019, 1
veröffentlicht:
Wiley
Medientyp: Artikel, E-Artikel

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weitere Informationen
ISSN: 1472-3891
1479-1854
DOI: 10.1002/pa.1877
veröffentlicht in: Journal of Public Affairs
Sprache: Englisch
Schlagwörter:
Kollektion: Wiley (CrossRef)
Inhaltsangabe

<jats:p>Previous research has concluded that ownership of economic resources that are politically valued leads to preferential outcomes during interactions with government officials. However, how the political context, and specifically the roles of the government actors involved, influences the relationship between political valued resources (PVRs) and desired outcomes has to date been relatively unexplored. In our paper, we argue that in interactions with elected legislators, PVRs are much more likely to lead to preferential outcomes. Conversely, due to the lack of power these resources have with bureaucrats in charge of regulatory enforcement, PVRs are less likely to lead to preferential outcomes. We provide some support for our arguments by looking for shifting patterns of effects in outcome variables that typically fall under the jurisdiction of each political role type. We find that large firms, export firms, and technology firms largely report having favorable influence over laws and regulations due to lobbying and increased foreign ownership, while also spending more days in inspections and more managerial time dealing with regulations.</jats:p>