Beteiligte: | |
---|---|
In: | Daedalus, 147, 2018, 3, S. 216-230 |
veröffentlicht: |
MIT Press - Journals
|
Medientyp: | Artikel, E-Artikel |
Umfang: | 216-230 |
---|---|
ISSN: |
0011-5266
1548-6192 |
DOI: | 10.1162/daed_a_00512 |
veröffentlicht in: | Daedalus |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Schlagwörter: | |
Kollektion: | MIT Press - Journals (CrossRef) |
<jats:p> The most effective anticorruption strategies combine prevention and enforcement. Yet the political payoffs are greater for enforcement-centered strategies, even though they often fail to achieve durable objectives. Autocratic regimes with endemic corruption thus tend to prefer enforcement-centered anticorruption strategies: they are easier to contain, while prevention-centered strategies risk undermining the rulers’ bases of power. This explains why the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has consistently favored an enforcement-centered anticorruption strategy. However, an overemphasis on enforcement, in the Chinese political context at least, has resulted in the politicization of anticorruption efforts and a lack of sustainability of such efforts. </jats:p> |