Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteiligte: Harutyunyan, Mushegh, Jiang, Baojun
In: Journal of Marketing Research, 56, 2019, 4, S. 679-690
veröffentlicht:
SAGE Publications
Medientyp: Artikel, E-Artikel

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weitere Informationen
Umfang: 679-690
ISSN: 1547-7193
0022-2437
DOI: 10.1177/0022243719827916
veröffentlicht in: Journal of Marketing Research
Sprache: Englisch
Schlagwörter:
Kollektion: SAGE Publications (CrossRef)
Inhaltsangabe

<jats:p> Conventional wisdom suggests that more intense competition will lower firms’ profits. The authors show that this may not hold in a channel setting with exclusive retailers. They find that a manufacturer and its retailer can both become worse off if their competing manufacturer and retailer with quality-differentiated products exit the market. Put differently, in a channel setting, more intense competition can be all-win for the manufacturer, the retailer, and the consumers. Interestingly, a high-quality manufacturer can benefit from an increase in its competitor’s perceived quality (e.g., due to favorable product reviews from consumers or third-party rating agencies). In other words, a manufacturer may prefer a strong rather than a weak enemy, and the manufacturer can have an incentive to help its competitor improve product quality or remain in the market. Furthermore, the authors show that a multiproduct monopolist manufacturer with an exclusive retailer may make higher profits by spinning off a product into a competing manufacturer that has its own retail channel, even without accounting for any proceeds from the spinoff. </jats:p>