Beteiligte: | |
---|---|
In: | Mind & Language, 15, 2000, 4, S. 400-432 |
veröffentlicht: |
Wiley
|
Medientyp: | Artikel, E-Artikel |
Umfang: | 400-432 |
---|---|
ISSN: |
0268-1064
1468-0017 |
DOI: | 10.1111/1468-0017.00142 |
veröffentlicht in: | Mind & Language |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Schlagwörter: | |
Kollektion: | Wiley (CrossRef) |
<jats:p>By distinguishing between prior intentions and intentions in action, Searle has helped solve a number of difficulties confronted by the earlier versions of the causal theory of actions. Yet this distinction also raises important new issues. In particular, once a distinction is posited between two types of intentions, one must specify what the exact nature of their respective contents is and explain how the two types of intentions are connected. I suggest that in addressing those issues we could benefit from the insights provided by recent work in the coginitive neuroscience of action. I try to show how this work can help us give a more precise characterization of the content of intentions in action and bridge the gap between prior intentions and intentions in action.</jats:p> |