Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteiligte: Patherie, Elisabeth
In: Mind & Language, 15, 2000, 4, S. 400-432
veröffentlicht:
Wiley
Medientyp: Artikel, E-Artikel

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Umfang: 400-432
ISSN: 0268-1064
1468-0017
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00142
veröffentlicht in: Mind & Language
Sprache: Englisch
Schlagwörter:
Kollektion: Wiley (CrossRef)
Inhaltsangabe

<jats:p>By distinguishing between prior intentions and intentions in action, Searle has helped solve a number of difficulties confronted by the earlier versions of the causal theory of actions. Yet this distinction also raises important new issues. In particular, once a distinction is posited between two types of intentions, one must specify what the exact nature of their respective contents is and explain how the two types of intentions are connected. I suggest that in addressing those issues we could benefit from the insights provided by recent work in the coginitive neuroscience of action. I try to show how this work can help us give a more precise characterization of the content of intentions in action and bridge the gap between prior intentions and intentions in action.</jats:p>