Following the Rules? Candidate Strategy in Presidential Primaries*

<jats:p><jats:bold>Objectives. </jats:bold> The competitiveness of the 2008 presidential primaries in both the Republican and Democratic parties has prompted a reconsideration of the role of delegate‐selection rules in influencing the strategic behavior of presidential candidates. Using advertising and candidate state‐visit data from the 2004 and 2008 presidential nominating campaigns, we reexamine the strategies presidential candidates use when competing for the nomination of their party.</jats:p><jats:p><jats:bold>Methods. </jats:bold> Using the Wisconsin Advertising Project Data from 2004 and 2008, we estimate several multiple regressions designed to analyze the factors predicting candidate visits and advertising.</jats:p><jats:p><jats:bold>Results. </jats:bold> We find that, to a large extent, the rules of the game help predict where candidates allocate their political advertising and campaign stops; candidates consider whether a contest is a primary or caucus, they pay attention to how many delegates are at stake, and they consider whether a state's delegate‐allocation method is largely proportional or winner take all. Yet we also find some differences in how the rules influence frontrunners and long‐shot candidates, and we discover how other factors, including a candidate's access to financial resources, influence the allocation of ads and visits.</jats:p><jats:p><jats:bold>Conclusion. </jats:bold> Our findings offer some of the first empirical evidence for the idea that a state's delegate‐allocation method influences candidates' resource‐allocation behavior. That these rules matter at all is somewhat of a surprise given that the delegate‐allocation methods used by states have become more homogenous within each party.</jats:p>