Is Information a Sufficient Basis for Cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske’s Approach

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteiligte: Díaz Nafría, José María, Pérez-Montoro, Mario
In: tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society, 9, 2011, 2, S. 358-366
veröffentlicht:
Information Society Research
Medientyp: Artikel, E-Artikel

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Umfang: 358-366
ISSN: 1726-670X
DOI: 10.31269/triplec.v9i2.285
veröffentlicht in: tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society
Sprache: Unbestimmt
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Kollektion: Information Society Research (CrossRef)
Inhaltsangabe

<jats:p>Based upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske’s approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object –tackled in Part 2 as a separate article– sets forth an informational boundary stating that information cannot be enough to support our cognitive processes. The problems do not rely –as Dretske supposes- on the lacks of the channel, but on the very nature of observation. Furthermore, Dretske’s approach –handcuffed to his maximalist support on information- presents some lacks concerning processual character of information, fuzziness of perception and knowledge, contents de dicto and conventional regularities. The posed limits and problems intend to settle new foundations for a more refined conjunction of information and knowledge.</jats:p>