Collusion in Restraint of Democracy: Against Political Deliberation

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Bibliographic Details
Authors and Corporations: Shapiro, Ian
In: Daedalus, 146, 2017, 3, p. 77-84
published:
MIT Press - Journals
Media Type: Article, E-Article

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further information
Physical Description: 77-84
ISSN: 0011-5266
1548-6192
DOI: 10.1162/daed_a_00448
published in: Daedalus
Language: English
Subjects:
Collection: MIT Press - Journals (CrossRef)
Table of Contents

<jats:p> Recent calls to inject substantial doses of deliberation into democratic politics rest on a misdiagnosis of its infirmities. Far from improving political outcomes, deliberation undermines competition over proposed political programs–the lifeblood of healthy democratic politics. Moreover, institutions that are intended to encourage deliberation are all too easily hijacked by people with intense preferences and abundant resources, who can deploy their leverage in deliberative settings to bargain for the outcomes they prefer. Arguments in support of deliberation are, at best, diversions from more serious threats to democracy, notably money's toxic role in politics. A better focus would be on restoring meaningful competition between representatives of two strong political parties over the policies that, if elected, they will implement. I sketch the main outlines of this kind of political competition, differentiating it from less healthy forms of multiparty and intraparty competition that undermine the accountability of governments. </jats:p>