Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteiligte: Call, Charles T., Campbell, Susanna P.
In: Daedalus, 147, 2018, 1, S. 64-77
veröffentlicht:
MIT Press - Journals
Medientyp: Artikel, E-Artikel

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Umfang: 64-77
ISSN: 1548-6192
0011-5266
DOI: 10.1162/daed_a_00474
veröffentlicht in: Daedalus
Sprache: Englisch
Schlagwörter:
Kollektion: MIT Press - Journals (CrossRef)
Inhaltsangabe

<jats:p> Is prevention the answer to escalating violent conflict? Conflict prevention uses carrots and sticks to deter future violence. Its power thus rests on the credibility of policy-makers' commitment to supply the carrot or stick in a timely manner. Unfortunately, there are several political and bureaucratic barriers that make this unlikely. First, it is difficult for policy-makers to sell preventive actions to their constituencies. In contrast with core security interests (like nuclear warfare), an uptick in violence in a faraway, nonstrategic country provides a less convincing call for action. Second, preventive decisions are difficult to make. Decision-makers are predisposed to avoid making difficult decisions until a crisis breaks out and they are forced to act. Third, preventive actions are political, not technical, requiring the use of precious political capital for uncertain outcomes whose success may be invisible (manifest in the absence of violence). Perhaps, if decision-makers are able to overcome these obstacles and make more credible commitments to conflict prevention, then conflict prevention will become a more credible solution to violent conflict. </jats:p>