Authors and Corporations: | |
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In: | Daedalus, 147, 2018, 3, p. 35-49 |
published: |
MIT Press - Journals
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Media Type: | Article, E-Article |
Physical Description: | 35-49 |
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ISSN: |
0011-5266
1548-6192 |
DOI: | 10.1162/daed_a_00501 |
published in: | Daedalus |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Collection: | MIT Press - Journals (CrossRef) |
<jats:p> While attention to corruption and anticorruption policies has increased dramatically in research and in policy, the results of many anticorruption and so-called good-governance programs have so far been unimpressive. I argue that this lack of success can be explained by the reliance on a theoretical approach-namely, the “principal-agent theory”-that seriously misconstrues the basic nature of the corruption problem. In this essay, I contend that the theory of collective action is a more fruitful foundation for developing anticorruption policies. I suggest that policy measures based on a collective-action understanding of corruption will be much less direct-and ultimately more effective-than approaches derived from the principal-agent theory. Taking inspiration from military theorist Basil Liddell Hart's “indirect approach” strategy, I argue that decision-makers should focus on policies that change the basic social contract, instead of relying solely on measures that are intended to change incentives for corrupt actors. </jats:p> |