Beteiligte: | |
---|---|
In: | Mind & Language, 16, 2001, 3, S. 263-283 |
veröffentlicht: |
Wiley
|
Medientyp: | Artikel, E-Artikel |
Umfang: | 263-283 |
---|---|
ISSN: |
0268-1064
1468-0017 |
DOI: | 10.1111/1468-0017.00169 |
veröffentlicht in: | Mind & Language |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Schlagwörter: | |
Kollektion: | Wiley (CrossRef) |
<jats:p>A linguistic theory is correct exactly to the extent that it is the explicit statement of a body of knowledge possessed by a designated language‐user. This popular psychological conception of the goal of linguistic theorizing is commonly paired with a preference for idiolectal over social languages, where it seems to be in the nature of idiolects that the beliefs one holds about one's own are <jats:italic>ipso facto</jats:italic> correct. Unfortunately, it is also plausible that the correctness of a genuine belief cannot consist merely in that belief's being held. This paper considers how best to eliminate this tension.</jats:p> |