Authors and Corporations: | |
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In: | Mind & Language, 12, 1997, 1, p. 84-100 |
published: |
Wiley
|
Media Type: | Article, E-Article |
Physical Description: | 84-100 |
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ISSN: |
0268-1064
1468-0017 |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00063.x |
published in: | Mind & Language |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Collection: | Wiley (CrossRef) |
<jats:p><jats:bold>Abstract: </jats:bold> In a series of papers, Sperber provides the following analysis of the phenomenon of ill‐understood belief (or ‘quasi‐belief’, as I call it): (i) the quasi‐believer has a validating meta‐belief, to the effect that a certain representation is true; yet (ii) that representation does not give rise to a plain belief, because it is ‘semi‐propositional’. In this paper I discuss several aspects of this treatment. In particular, I deny that the representation accepted by the quasi‐believer is semantically indeterminate, and I reject Sperber's claim that quasi‐belief is a credal attitude distinct from plain belief.</jats:p> |