Beteiligte: | |
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In: | Mind & Language, 33, 2018, 3, S. 242-262 |
veröffentlicht: |
Wiley
|
Medientyp: | Artikel, E-Artikel |
Umfang: | 242-262 |
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ISSN: |
0268-1064
1468-0017 |
DOI: | 10.1111/mila.12177 |
veröffentlicht in: | Mind & Language |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Schlagwörter: | |
Kollektion: | Wiley (CrossRef) |
<jats:p>According to intellectualism, knowing how to V is a matter of knowing a suitable proposition about a way of V‐ing. In this paper, I consider the question of which ways of acting might figure in the propositions that intellectualists claim constitute the object of knowledge‐how. I argue that intellectualists face a version of the generality problem—familiar from discussions of reliabilism—as not all ways of V‐ing are such that knowledge about them suffices for knowledge‐how. I consider various responses to this problem and argue that none are satisfactory.</jats:p> |