Beteiligte: | |
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In: | Mind & Language, 34, 2019, 1, S. 21-36 |
veröffentlicht: |
Wiley
|
Medientyp: | Artikel, E-Artikel |
Umfang: | 21-36 |
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ISSN: |
0268-1064
1468-0017 |
DOI: | 10.1111/mila.12190 |
veröffentlicht in: | Mind & Language |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Schlagwörter: | |
Kollektion: | Wiley (CrossRef) |
<jats:p>Non‐human animal evidence is frequently invoked in debates in cognitive science. Here, I critically assess one use of such evidence in the form of the “argument from animals,” a prominent positive argument for nativism, which roughly states that non‐human cognitive development is largely nativist, and thus human cognitive development is most likely largely nativist too. I offer a number of reasons to reject this argument, and in doing so derive some important broader lessons concerning the appropriate role of non‐human animal evidence in a science of the human mind.</jats:p> |